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THE SOCIO-LEGAL IMPACT OF
EQUAL PAY LEGISLATION IN
ONTARIO, 1946-1979e
By

ROBERT MALARKEY* & JOHN HAGAN**

Equal pay legislation in Ontario has been a source of considerable attention,
concern, and conflict since the late nineteenth century. A variety of women's
organizations, human rights groups, labour unions, and political parties actively
promoted equal pay for equal work legislation. In March 1951, the Ontario
provincial government did enact an equal pay law to rectify perceived inequities
between male and female workers. Since that initial legislation, numerous
individuals and groups have complained that this legislation has done little to narrow
the male-female wage differential in Ontario. In this article we argue that, in fact,
the Ontario government's equal pay law of 1951 did serve to reduce the malefemale wage gap in a variety of jobs over the past thirty years. This contention is
seen as providing a positive context for the equal pay for work of equal value
legislation recently enacted by Ontario's present Liberal government.

I. INTRODUCTION
Women's organizations, political opposition parties, and
academics frequently have argued that equal pay legislation in a
province like Ontario has done little or nothing to reduce the malefemale wage differential.1 They maintain that wages for females in
C

Copyright, 1989, R. Malarkey and J.Hagan.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Redeemer College.

** Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Toronto.
1 S.Ostry, The Female Worker in Canada(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, Census Monograph,
D.BS., Cat. No. 99-553, 1968); M. Clarke, "Equal Pay In Ontario: Challenges and Options"
Issues and Options: Equal Pay/Equal Opportunity (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour,
1978); M. Gunderson, "rime Patterns of Male-Female Wage Differentials: Ontario, 1946-
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the work force have been approximately 65 percent of male wages,
with minimal improvement over time. This view is a source of
political pressure on the present Ontario Liberal government to
enact equal pay legislation that will be effective. But is it accurate
to say that Ontario's equal pay legislation has had little or no impact
on male-female wage differentials? Is a conclusion of little or no
impact actually a valid prerequisite for new legislative efforts? Or,
is there a different and more encouraging context in which to place
past legislative efforts in Ontario? This paper offers answers to such
questions.
Before assessing the impact of Ontario's equal pay law, first
enacted in March 1951, we emphasize that this law dealt with a
serious problem. 2 Wage differentials between male and female
workers in Ontario were large and had existed for years prior to the
enactment of Ontario's equal pay law. The teaching profession, for
example, has a long history of females being paid less than males for
essentially the same work. A salary schedule from 1858 in Toronto
illustrates how substantial these wage differentials were (see Table
1). Regardless of rank, male teachers made approximately twice as
much money as their female counterparts. By 1902 female teachers
in Ontario outnumbered male teachers 6,297 to 2,200. 4 As Table 25
indicates, however, male-female wage differentials persisted well into
the twentieth century. For the years 1858-1930, starting salaries for
male teachers in Toronto were two to three times higher than for
female teachers.

1971" (1976) 31 Relations Industrielles/lndustrial Relations at 57-71.
2 Ontario's equal pay law of March 1951 was entitled The Female Employees Fair
Remuneration Act, S.O. 1951, c. 26 [hereinafter FEFRA]. FEFRA was later incorporated into
the OntarioHuman Rights Code, S.O. 1961-62, c. 93, s.5. This law was transferred back to
the Ministry of Labour in 1968 as part of the Employment StandardsAct, S.O. 1968, c. 35, s.
19.
3 See infra at 327.
4 J. Acton, P. Goldsmith, & B. Shepard, eds, Women at Work:

(Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974) at 200.
5 See infra at 328.
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The teaching profession was not the only occupation in which
wage gaps existed. An Ontario Bureau of Industries report for the
year 1884 indicates that the average annual wage for men during
that year was $394.34, based on an average work week of 59 hours.
The average annual wage for women was $133.09, based on a work
week of 59.5 hours. Male bookkeepers earned $11.83 for a 57-hour
week; females earned $4.90 for a 54-hour week. Male cigar makers
earned $9.45 for a 58-hour week; females earned $3.72 for a 59.7hour week.6
An 1892 report.by Jean Thomson Scott, The Conditions of
Female Labour in Ontario, dealt in part with male-female wage
differentials. Scott indicated that in areas such as tailoring, retail
sales, stenography, bookkeeping, and teaching, the wages for female
7
workers were consistently lower than those for male workers.
Wage differentials between male and female workers doing
similar work continue on a yearly basis. The federal Department of
Labour has been publishing data since 1921 in volumes entitled
Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour in Canada.8 These data
were analyzed for the years 1921, 1930, 1940, and 1950.
Few
occupations had data for both male and female workers, as women
generally did not work in construction, metal trades, lumbering, and
mining, for instance. In cotton and wool manufacturing, however,
separate information is provided for male and female workers.
Summary measures of wage differentials for the years 19211950 in cotton and wool manufacturing are reported in Table 3. 9
From the summary chart in Table 3, it appears that between 1921
and 1950 the wage gap between male and female employees
improved; that is, the ratio of female to male wages (WffWm)
increased. But in 1950, women in Ontario were still experiencing

6 L.S. Bohnen, "Women Workers in Ontario; A Socio-Legal Histoiy" (1973) 31 U.T. Fac.

L Rev. at 45-74.
7 .T. Scott, The Conditions of Fonale Labour in Ontario (Toronto: Toronto University
Studies in Political Science, 1892) at 23-24.
8 Canada, Department of Labour, Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour in Canada
(Ottawa: Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, 1920-1980).
9 See infra at 328.
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wage differentials as low as .58 (Sales Clerk) with a median wage
differential of .76 (see Table 4)!
Yearly wages in Ontario in agriculture for the years 19201939 show a similar trend. The median wage differential was .72 for
the period 1920-1929 and .77 for the period 1930-1939.11
Wage differentials are a long-term problem. From 1850 to
1950, there is a clear trend of female workers being paid less than
their male counterparts. Not all of this wage gap can be attributed
to sex discrimination. More will be said later about this gap, but for
now it seems obvious that some form of male-female wage
differential existed during the years 1850-1950. What is also obvious
from a study of the equal pay issue during this period is that the
existence of a wage gap did not go unnoticed or unprotested.
II. EQUAL PAY SUPPORT, 1850-1950
Equal pay legislation in Ontario did not occur in a social,
political, economic, or historical vacuum.
Unions, women's
organizations, international organizations, the media, and
governments themselves protested unequal pay for women workers
and advocated various solutions. These concerns and protests were
not as intense in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as in
later years because many women were not doing the same jobs as
men. In addition to domestic service, many women worked as
dressmakers, seamstresses, and milliners in small factories and textile
mills. Nevertheless, male-female wage differentials did become a
focus of concern for various interest groups.
One of the earliest initiatives for promoting equal pay for
equal work in Canada came from the Toronto Trades and Labour
Council in 1882. Point three of their platform of principles stated
the objective: "Equal pay for equal work for both sexes."12 The
10 See

infra at 329.

11 R. Malarkey, The Emergence of Equal Pay Legislation it Ontario, (University of
Toronto, 1987) [unpublished Ph.D. thesis] Tables 8 and 9.

12 Canada, Department of Labour, Equal Pay for Equal Work (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1959) at 4.

1989]

Equal Pay Legislation

National Council of Women had been pushing for equal pay
legislation since the Council began in 1893. The Labour Gazette,
the official organ of the federal Department of Labour, reported on
the twentieth annual convention of the National Council of Women
in 1913. One of the eight recommendations adopted at this
convention advocated: "Equal rewards for equal work regardless of
sex." These resolutions were used as policy statements by the
National Council to federal and provincial governments.13
Female teachers made known their resentment of being paid
one-half the salary of their male colleagues. In 1904, women
teachers in Toronto marched into a Board of Education meeting to
demand pay equal to that of male teachers. 14 In April 1913, a
correspondent to the Labour Gazette in Toronto reported that the
Toronto Board of Education was under "considerable criticism" for
its salary schedule for that year. The report stated that "women
teachers feel that there is an unfair discrimination in the matter of
salaries, and equal pay for equal work is their contention."15 The
report gave an example of the current salary schedule in which a
male teacher made twice the money per year as did a female teacher
teaching the same grade, both with five years of experience. In
1918, the Federation of Women Teachers' Association of Ontario
organized and made equal pay for equal work one of their central
objectives. 16 None of these efforts experienced much success,
however, until the 1940s.
Although the federal public service had a policy of equal pay
for equal work since the 1880s, it was seldom implemented because

13 Canada, The LabourGazette (Ottawa: Department of Labour, June 1913) at 1372-75.
14 W. Roberts, Honest Womanhood (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1976) at 34.
15 Canada, "Conditions of Employment Among Women Workers in Leading Industrial
Centres - Reports of Women Correspondents to the Labour Gazette' The Labour Gazette

(Ottawa: Department of Labour, April 1913) at 1077.
16 E. Graham, "Schoolmarms and Early Teaching in Ontario" in J.Acton, P. Goldsmith
& B. Shepard, eds, Women at Work, Ontario 1850-1930 (Toronto:

Education Press, 1974) at 196.
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women seldom assumed government positions held by men. 17 But
with the increased demand for labour created by World War I,
women increasingly were doing jobs that previously only men had
done. Women worked in munitions factories and the railways, and
a large number worked in steel, cement, and shoe manufacturing.
As a result of increased experience and training, more women were
doing the same job as the men in factories and shops. In 1918, the
last year of the war, the Privy Council issued an Order-in-Council
with respect to equal pay for women involved in war production:
"That women on work ordinarily performed by men should be
allowed equal pay for equal work and should not be allotted tasks
disproportionate to their strength."1 8 However, this Order-in-Council
applied only to industries involved in war production and only for
the duration of the war.
The period between the two world wars was relatively quiet
with respect to the equal pay issue. In the economic prosperity of
the 1920s, fewer women had to work and if they did work, their
wages were improving. In the economic depression of the 1930s, the
issue was having a job, not equal pay. With jobs at a premium and
the wages of virtually everyone reduced by 50 percent or more, the
issue of equal pay for female workers receded into the background.
With the advent of another world war, the demand for
labour became greater than the supply. Once again many women
were performing jobs that previously only men had performed. The
issue of equal pay for equal work emerged with renewed intensity.
The federal government issued a Wartime Wages Control Order in
1941 that prohibited an employer from changing "the basic scales of
wage rates or altering the terms of employment which were in effect
on November 15, 1941. ''19
After World War II, labour unions, women's organizations,
and opposition parties like the CCF (Canadian Commonwealth
Federation) converged on the equal pay issue. They invested a
great deal of time, money, and effort to promote an equal pay law
17 See Bohnen, supra, note 6 at 61.
18 Canada, The Labour Gazette (Ottawa: Department of Labour, August 1918) at 617.
19 Supra, note 12 at 6.
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in Ontario. The Progressive Conservative government of Leslie
Frost eventually responded with the enactment of the Female
Employees FairRemuneration Act, 1951.20 This legislation was the
first equal pay law enacted in the entire British Commonwealth.
The operative section stated:
(1) No employer and no person acting on his behalf shall discriminate between his
male and female employees by paying a female employee at a rate of pay less than
the rate of pay paid to a male
employee employed by him for the same work done
21
in the same establishment.

III. THE IMPACT OF FEFRA
Frost's Progressive Conservative government had high hopes
for FEFRA. Did these hopes materialize? It depends on whom we
ask. When we consult the Annual Reports of the Ministry of
Labour, it appears that FEFRA did the job. The Fair Employment
Practices Branch had been established in June 1951 to administer
FEFRA and The FairEmployment Practices.Act, 1951.22 FEFRA came
into force 1 January 1952. By the time of the Annual Report for the
year ending 31 March 1952,23 FEFRA had only been in effect for
three months. One complaint had been received, however, and a
conciliation officer had been sent to investigate the complaint. The
Annual Report stated that "the differential in the rate of pay was
24
found to be the result of actual difference in job content.
During the period 1952-1960, 124 complaints alleging
violation of FEFRA by twelve employers had been sent to the director.
Conciliation officers apparently "resolved" those complaints. No
20 S.O. 1951, c. 26.
21 Ibid, s. 2.
22 S.O. 1951, c. 24, as rep. The OntarioHuman Rights Code, 1961-62, S.O. 1961-62, c.
93, s. 19.
23 Ontario, Department of Labour, Annual Reports (33d Report) (Toronto: Baptist
Johnston, 1952) at 35.

24 Ibid

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[yoi- 27 No. 2

25
commissions, prosecutions, or fines occurred during these years.
On the basis of this information from the Ministry of Labour, we
might say that FEFRA had been an unqualified success.
Other organizations and individuals were not greatly
impressed with the effectiveness of FEFRA, however. Writing in 1954,
Margery Pewtress expressed considerable doubt about the
effectiveness of Ontario's equal pay act. 26 Pewtress began her article
in Saturday Night by stating that FEFRA definitely "did not usher in
the millennium."27 Pewtress maintained that some school boards
were still advertising for teachers using different rates for male and
female teachers. Pewtress asserted that although some employers in
Ontario had revised their wages to conform to FEFRA, others had
not. In fact, employers were adding some additional duties to male
job descriptions to "circumvent the Act." According to Pewtress,
even labour unions had not pushed for equal pay in collective
agreements and had not challenged "hair
splitting" job descriptions
28
aimed at justifying lower pay to women.
In March 1955, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America sent a formal complaint about FEFRA to Charles
Daley, Minister of Labour. The union complained about loopholes
in the Act and about the fact that individuals had to carry out the
complaint procedure without union representation. The union
29
further complained that the penalty for violation was meaningless.
In 1956, a Private Member's Bill was introduced into the
Ontario Legislature to change what was perceived as basic
weaknesses in FEFRA. In particular, the Bill proposed that the phrase
"the same work" in section 2(1) be amended to read "work of
comparable character, the performance of which requires comparable

25 Ontario, Department of Labour, Annual Reports (Toronto: Baptist Johnston, 19521960).
26 M. Pewtress, "Equal Pay" Saturday Night (6 March 1954) 26.
27

bid

28 Ibid
29 R. Chud, "The History of the Equal Pay Laws in Ontario" (Toronto:
Department of Labour, Women's Directorate, April 1976) [unpublished].
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skills. '30 Frost's Progressive Conservative government defeated the
Bill.
In May 1956, the Ontario Federation of Printing Trades
Union met in Windsor for their annual convention. One of the
several resolutions passed was "to amend the Female Employees Fair
Remuneration Act of 1951 to prevent discrimination against women
wage earners and to allow unions to represent their members in any
such complaint."31 The union felt that FEFRA had been generally
ineffective, and they were disturbed that the Act did not permit them
to represent a woman in their union who had a complaint.
We have some indication of how the business community
responded to equal pay legislation from a 1955 FinancialPost article
written by Jack McArthur.3 2 This article came at a time when the
federal government had introduced an equal pay bill in the House
of Commons and criticism of the "unworkability" of the Ontario law
was mounting. McArthur attempted to explain why there was
opposition to equal pay laws. The title of the article summarized
the thrust of McArthur's remarks - "Strong Opposition, Weak Voice:
The Case Against Legislating Equal Pay for Women." The article
began with these words: "There is a massive unvoiced reluctance to
the passing of legislation giving women the same pay as men for
comparable work. Few quarrel with the principle. Like opposition
to sin, preservation of the family unit, and a chicken in every pot,
it's wonderful."33
McArthur makes the point that opposition to equal pay
legislation is not a very popular position to take publicly. Therefore,
many who have criticisms don't voice them. It is too easy to be
misunderstood. Furthermore, many who may be in favour of the
principle of equal pay for equal work see a huge problem in turning
30 Canada, "Bills Not Passed" The Labour Gazette (Ottawa:

Department of Labour,

November 1956) at 1412.
31 Canada, "Ontario Printing Unions Hold Annual Convention" The Labour Gazette

(Ottawa: Department of Labour, June 1956) at 628.
32 J. MeArthur, "Strong Opposition, Weak Voice: The Case Against Legislating Equal
Pay for Women" FinancialPost (26 February 1955) at 7.
33 1bid
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this principle into a law that works. There are always too many
loopholes.
McArthur then outlines some of the "sincere contentions"
about equal pay legislation held by people within government,
management, and labour about equal pay legislation. There is the
old problem of determining whether a woman is in fact doing equal
work, especially when it comes to aspects like the exercise of
responsibility. Secondly, there is the difficulty of determining if a
wage differential is due to sex discrimination or to some other factor.
Thirdly, enforcement of an equal pay law could result in the
shutdown of a business because of increased labour costs. A job
with lower pay is better than no job at all. Lastly, the "most
powerful weapon" to counteract wage discrimination is for women
themselves to refuse to accept lower wages for equal work.3 4 The
importance of this article is in its indication of the attitudes and
perceptions that were still very much alive after FEFRA became law.
The law did not eradicate deeply held opinions, values, and
prejudices of men about women workers.
Is there any objective evidence with respect to the impact of
FEFRA during the 1952-1962 period? In one fundamental respect
this is an irrelevant question.
The crucial factor was how
government officials, labour unions, women's organizations, and the
business community were looking at Ontario's equal pay law. They
were the relevant social actors whose words and deeds served to
promote, change, or resist FEFRA. The perceptions of these various
interest groups were examined above. There is some value,
however, in placing alongside the perceived impact of FEFRA an
independent analysis of this Act. Such analysis provides a degree of
distance from the situation not possible for those who were
intimately caught up in the conflict.
An often cited 1968 study by Sylvia Ostry of the Federal
Department of Labour, Women's Bureau, reported that in 1951, the
ratio of median wages and salaries of female to male workers in
Canada was 55.2 percent. In 1961, this figure stood at 54.9 percent.
During this ten-year period, the earnings differential remained

34

Ibid
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unchanged or even increased slightly.35 Ostry points out, however,
that these are gross calculations and need to be adjusted for factors
such as the different occupational distribution of male and female
workers, part-time employment, education, training, work experience,
and absenteeism. Calculations which account for the earnings
differential with respect to full-time versus part-time employment
show that the gap narrows somewhat - from 54.2 to 59.3 percent when all occupations are aggregated. In specific occupations, such
as those in the Professional and Technical category, the earnings
differential decreases significantly - from 43.3 to 61.2 percent (see
Table 5)36

When occupational distribution, age, and educational level
were adjusted for, the earnings gap narrowed further. Weighted
averages showed that the differential had decreased for full-time
workers from 59.3 percent to a range of 77.5 to 85 percent (see
37 The earnings differential after these adjustments was
Table 6).
reduced to between 15 to 22 percent. Other factors such as the
urban-rural distinction, regional differences, turnover, and
absenteeism could further decrease this wage gap. Ostry concluded:
"However it seems clear that some portion of the residual
differential stemmed from 'discrimination', i.e. from the fact that
women were paid less than men for comparable work."38
Ostry's analysis, however, does not speak directly to our
particular issue. Ostry used data for all of Canada, not specifically
for Ontario. Also, Ostry's data aggregated numerous occupations
and did not deal with specific jobs in specific business establishments.
Morley Gunderson has analyzed wage differentials for specific jobs
in Ontario. Gunderson did a time series regression analysis of nine
specific occupations in Ontario between the years 1946-1971 with

See Ostry, supra, note 1 at 39.
36 See infra at 330.
37 See infra at 331.
38 See Ostry, supra, note 1 at 43.

306

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27 NO. 2

respect to male-female wage differentials.3 9 This is an important
advance over earlier work, as it replaced the use of demographic
decomposition procedures with more sophisticated structural equation
models. Using such models, Gunderson found no evidence that
equal pay legislation had any effect on narrowing the wage gap
during this time period. However, Gunderson's analysis has a
different focus than our own. Rather than assess the possible
impact of FEFRA beginning with its enforcement in January 1952,
Gunderson used January 1969 as the critical date and structured his
time series regression analysis around that point in time. Gunderson
was aware that equal pay provisions existed prior to January 1969,
but his focus was on later developments. He explains that before
1969 Ontario's equal pay policy was administered by the Ontario
Human Rights Commission, which "relied mainly on persuasive
tactics."40 In January 1969, the equal pay provisions were transferred
to the Ministry of Labour and became part of the Employment
StandardsAct. 41 Gunderson refers to the 1946-1968 period as the
"pre-legislation period" and to the 1969-1971 period as the "postlegislation period."42
Our own focus is on the initial passage of FEFRA. This focus
includes a period when the Ministry of Labour enforced Ontario's
equal pay law (from January 1952 to January 1962), prior to the
provisions of FEFRA being transferred to the Ontario Human Rights
Commission. 43 The Human Rights Commission administered the
equal pay provisions until January 1969, when the provisions were
transferred back to the Ministry of Labour.44 The intention is, then,

See Gunderson, supra, note 1 at 57-71.
40 Ibid at 64. Actually, FEFRA was administered by the Ministry of Labour from 1952
to 1962 and then was transferred to the Ontario Human Rights Commission from 1962 to
1969.
41 S.O. 1968, c. 35, s. 19(1).
42 See Gunderson, supra, note 1 at 64-65.
43 See supra, note 2.
44 See infra, notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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to set up the time series analysis in a way that allows us to identify
the possible impact of FEFRA on male-female wage differentials prior
to 1969. By this time, FEFRA had been in place for seventeen years.
The impact that Ontario's equal pay law might have achieved might
well have taken place by January 1969. Building on Gunderson's
application of structural equation time series techniques, we offer a
new analysis of the impact of FEFRA.
IV. FEFRA's IMPACT
Our objective in this analysis is not to identify the variable
with the most explanatory power with respect to variation in malefemale wage differentials. Rather, we are attempting to evaluate
whether or not Ontario's equal pay law had any influence in
narrowing the gender wage gap in Ontario. In order to evaluate the
impact of FEFRA on wage differentials, we need to recognize that
this equal pay legislation was not operating in a socio-economic
vacuum. Changes in the social, economic, and political dimensions
of Ontario society were taking place during the post-legislative time
period. Therefore, it is important to include in our analysis
variables other than the equal pay law in order to get a more
complete picture of how equal pay legislation may have affected
wage differentials. The two other variables chosen for our analysis
are time and the annual unemployment rate in Ontario.4 5 Through
the variable of time, we can obtain some idea of the combined
impact of social, economic, and political factors that were at work
during the 1946-1979 period. The Ontario unemployment rate
measures the impact of fluctuations in the business cycle on malefemale wage differentials. Historically, business cycles have been a
powerful determinant of wages and wage differentials.
There are various dimensions of time as an explanatory
variable relevant to male-female wage differentials. Consider the

45 I am using the same independent variables as Gunderson used in order to evaluate
his conclusion about Ontario's equal pay law. I am indebted to Gunderson for permission to

use his data base. The critical difference between the quantitative analysis in our study and
Gunderson's research is our use of 1952, rather than 1969, as the important historical point

for post-legislative impact analysis.
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following range of possibilities.
The increased labour force
participation of women after World War II could have served to
continue and entrench existing wage differentials. On the other
hand, this factor could have broken down barriers that discriminated
against women in the workplace. As more women worked in various
types of jobs, sex stereotyping may have been reduced, providing
better jobs and better pay for females. 46 Over time, increased
knowledge about the productivity and competence of women in the
work force could lead to a reduction of the wage gap between males
and females.
We know that the growth of the service sector during the
past forty years has been particularly important in increasing the
demand for female workers. With the increased supply of female
workers, there was also an increased demand for their labour force
participation. It would be reasonable to expect that this new
demand would function to reduce the male-female wage gap.
Nevertheless, forces of competition could work to continue or even
increase gender wage differences. To reduce costs and increase
profits, employers may try various means to hire women at lower
wages than men. Or, an employer, in the name of "pay equity,"
could decide to freeze male salaries or at least decrease the rate of
annual increase in order to reduce labour costs and, therefore, be
more competitive. Such a decision would serve to decrease the
gender-related wage differential.
Since the 1940s, federal and provincial government agencies
and services have grown at a phenomenal rate. We would expect
the government, as a major employer in the Canadian economy, to
honour its own anti-discrimination policies. In this regard, we could
anticipate a decrease in the differences between male and female
wages during the time period that we are analyzing. On the other
hand, Kathleen Archibald has argued in Sex and the Public Service
that sex discrimination in government has been rampant over the
47
years in terms of employment opportunities and wages for females.

46 See Gunderson, supra, note 1 at 59.
47 K. Archibald, Sex and the Public Service (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973).
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If there is any merit to this argument, government hiring activity
would have been a factor in increasing the gender wage gap.
Thus, in and of itself, time as an independent explanatory
variable does not provide us with a compelling theoretical argument
for the decrease or increase of male-female wage differentials. The
question has to be resolved empirically. Within the dimension of
time, there are various contradictory forces which may increase the
wage gap during one period of time and decrease it during another.
Even though all the time-related factors cannot be disentangled and
isolated, the time variable does provide us with information about
the overall influence of these factors as they act and interact with
each other.48 Time series regression analysis is particularly suited to
capture this net impact of time on wage differentials.
The annual unemployment rate in Ontario is being used to
measure the nature of economic conditions in Ontario during the
1946-1979 period. The unemployment rate is a standard indicator
of the health or lack of health of a particular economy. The
unemployment rate reflects the fluctuations in the business cycle that
have become an integral part of an industrial economy. As an
explanatory variable, the unemployment rate would be expected to
affect male-female wage differentials in a direct manner. When
there is low unemployment because of economic prosperity, there is
a growing demand for workers, including females. Such demand for
female workers would be expected to lead to an increase in female
wages and a decrease in the male-female wage gap. During an
economic recession, however, the opposite effect should occur. A
surplus of female workers would tend to reduce female wages, as
employers implement cost-cutting measures to survive the economic
downturn. When business survival becomes the major priority,
demands for pay equity tend to be ignored.
Again, however, the actual impact of unemployment on wage
differentials is an empirical question. Some economists have argued
that business prosperity draws so many women into the labour force
that it has a depressing effect on female wages.49 In other words,

48 See Gunderson, supra, note 1 at 59-61.
49 Ibid at 62.
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there is low unemployment but wages do not necessarily reflect this
economic prosperity. Rather, increased profits dominate the
prosperous business cycle. This is especially true in non-unionized
business establishments, which constitute a large segment of the
labour force at any given time. Our time series regression analysis
should provide useful information as to which theoretical possibility
actually occurred in Ontario during the 1946-1979 time period.
Our variable of central interest is the equal pay legislation
enacted by the Ontario government in March 1951 and proclaimed
in force in January 1952. Indeed, the reason for doing this time
series regression analysis is to evaluate the impact of FEFRA on malefemale wage differentials in Ontario after the legislation was in
force. As in the case of the variables of time and unemployment,
theoretical arguments can be offered both for a positive and a
negative impact. The more obvious argument is that employers
complied with FEFRA and adjusted female wage rates to conform to
the equal pay for equal work law. In economic language, the equal
pay law increased the cost of pay discrimination against females in
terms of possible fines and loss of a "good reputation" in the
community 50 Businesses are image conscious and have no desire
to be labelled publicly as "exploiters" of women. We would,
therefore, expect the equal pay law of March 1951 to have begun a
process of reducing male-female wage differences.
This argument, however, can be countered by the observation
that, given the narrow terms of FEFRA - the same job in the same
establishment - employers could have easily side-stepped the
requirements of this law. If this occurred to any significant extent,
we would see minimal or no decrease in the wage gap due to equal
pay legislation. Employers could have reclassified the jobs of male
workers by adding an additional responsibility or two and attaching
a minimal increase in pay to this reclassification. Such an attempt
to avoid the equal pay provisions would have served to increase
further wage differences between male and female workers.
These theoretical possibilities can only be resolved
empirically, not theoretically. A time series structural equation
approach allows us to control for the impact of the long-term time
50 kid at 63.

1989]

Equal Pay Legislation

trend and the short-term business cycle so that we can determine if
Ontario's equal pay legislation had any independent effect on
gender-related wage differentials.
A. Data Base for Analysis
Data were obtained from the annual volumes produced by
the Economics and Research Branch of the Federal Department of
51
Labour, entitled Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour.
During the 1946-1979 period, continuous wage data in cents per
hour are reported for nine occupations with male and female
workers. These are jobs in which women were working in sufficient
numbers, along with their male counterparts, to be reported to the
federal government by business establishments in Ontario having
twenty or more employees. The nine jobs, together with their
industry groups, are as follows:
BAKERIES

HOSIERY AND KNITTED
GOODS

1. Baker Helper
2. Packager

3. Cutter
4. Knitting Machine Tender

MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS

ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL
EQUIPMENT

5. Inspector
6. Machine Tool Operator
7. Product Assembler

8. Assembler
9. Coil-Winding Machine
Tender

These are the same nine occupations used by Gunderson in
his studies of the impact of equal pay legislation on male-female
wage differentials in Ontario. These jobs are narrowly defined,
which is important for our purposes because the need to control for
factors such as differences in training and experience is minimized.

Supra, note 8.

312

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27 No. 2

The nine jobs are all unskilled or semi-skilled occupations in which
males and females performed essentially the same work. If this had
not been the case, the male and female workers would not have
been grouped together under the same occupational category.52 We
are dealing, then, with male-female wage differentials in specific jobs,
that is, intra-occupational wage differences. This type of wage
differential is precisely what FEFRA was intended to correct. We are
not involved in an analysis of the impact of equal pay legislation on
inter-occupational wage differentials such as that between a female
secretary and a male janitor. The Ontario government is only now
beginning to deal with that issue legislatively.
Using structural equations, we can control for the long term
influence of time and the short term influence of business cycle
fluctuations in order to evaluate the impact of Ontario's equal pay
law on male-female wage differentials. The initial equation for this
analysis is: (Wm-Wf)/Wf = b0 + b1T + b2U + b3 L, where (WinWf)/Wf, the dependent variable, is the proportionate male-female
wage differential, T is time, U is the unemployment rate, and L is
the Ontario equal pay law of 1952; b0 is the regression constant and
bl, b2 , and b3 are the regression coefficients. The dependent
variable is measured in cents per hour, time is measured by the last
two digits of each year from 1946 to 1979, the unemployment rate
is indicated by percent of work force unemployed per year, and the
equal pay law is quantified by a dummy variable (1946-1951 = 0;
1952-1979 = 1).

B. EmpiricalResults
Our time series results are somewhat different than
Gunderson's. Gunderson concludes from his time series analyses
that "there is no clear narrowing of the differential in response to
the equal pay legislation of 1969,"53 and that "after controlling for
the long run trend and short run cyclical fluctuations of the male52 M. Gunderson, "Spline Function Estimates of the Impact of Equal Pay Legislation"

(Toronto: Centre for Industrial Relations, 1985) [unpublished] at 7.
53 See Gunderson, supra, note 1 at 68.
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female wage gap the equal pay legislation did not usually have a
significant impact on narrowing the gap."54 Our results suggest a
selective and modest narrowing of male-female wage differentials in
Ontario.
The time series regression results are presented in Tables 79.55 Table 7 presents results for a linear fit of the data. Looking
at the column labelled Equal Pay, we see that there are four
statistically significant beta coefficients for this variable - two with
a positive sign and two with a negative sign. This meafis that in
occupations 3 and 8 (hosiery cutter and electrical equipment
assembler), the equal pay legislation tended to increase the malefemale wage gap. In occupations 5 and 7 (auto parts inspector and
product assembler), however, the equal pay law decreased the gender
wage differentials. Such results are at least consistent with the
argument that the Ontario equal pay law of 1951 had a modest
narrowing impact on selected male-female wage differences. As we
will see, further evidence is available to support this conclusion.
However, some further observations and remarks should first
be made about these initial linear regression results. To this point,
our analysis assumes an error term with a random probability
distribution. It is assumed that the error terms in any given analysis
are independent of one another. However, in time series analysis
this assumption is often not correct. Since we are working with
variables over time rather than cross-sectionally, there is a strong
presumption that the error term in one time period influences the
error term in the next time period. This phenomenon is referred to
as serial correlation or autocorrelation. When autocorrelation is
present in a time series regression analysis, it does not affect the
It does affect the variances of the
regression coefficients.
coefficients, the coefficient of determination (R2 ), and all tests for
statistical significance. 56 In the presence of high autocorrelation,
the estimated variance will be significantly underestimated, R2 will
See Gunderson, supra, note 52 at 9.

55 See infra at 332-334.
56 C. Ostrom, Time Series Analysis:
Publications, 1978) at 16.
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be substantially overestimated, and the t-test and F-test for statistical
significance are no longer reliable.
We checked the regression results in Tables 7-9 for
autocorrelation in any occupation which showed that the equal pay
legislation decreased or increased the male-female wage differential.
We used a three-stage process to evaluate potential autocorrelation,
beginning with the standard Durbin-Watson statistic for
autocorrelation. If the Durbin-Watson d-statistic for any given
occupation was in the inconclusive region, a Theil-Nager Q-value
was calculated 5 7 If the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic was below
the Theil-Nager Q-value, an autocorrelation coefficient was
calculated.58
Occupation 5 (auto parts inspector), as indicated in the last
column of Table 7, had a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.66, which is
above the-upper limit of the D-W test. We can conclude that the
distorting effects of the autocorrelated error terms were minimal in
this case. The Durbin-Watson result of 1.55 for occupation 7
(product assembler) was below the D-W upper limit and slightly
below the Theil-Nager Q-value of 1.58. The autocorrelation
coefficient was calculated and found to be p = .24, which is well
below significant autocorrelation and passes the rigorous test of
Hibbs which calls for using generalized least squares rather than
ordinary least squares if p > .30.59 Both of our occupations that
indicate that the 1951 equal pay law had a narrowing effect on malefemale wage differentials, then, pass the autocorrelation test.
Occupations 3 and 8, which indicate an increase in male-female wage
differentials, do not pass the autocorrelation test; they yield
autocorrelation coefficients of .33 and .51 respectively.
Another problem associated with structural equation models
involves the distorting effects of the collinearity of independent
variables. If one independent variable is a linear function of another
57

Ibid-at 34-35.

58 The formula used to calculate the autocorrelation coefficient is [T 2 (1-1/2 d) + K2 ]
2)
(T - K where T equals the number of years for which data has been collectcd, d equals

the Durbin-Watson statistic, and K equals the number of regressors used in the regression
analysis.

59 See Ostrom, supra, note 56 at 35.
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independent variable, collinearity results; that is, the two independent
variables are not independent of each other. This problem can be
visualized using vector geometry. Collinearity exists when two lines
lie on top of one another so that each point on one line also
defines the coordinates of the second line. When collinearity exists,
the independent variables in question do not provide uniquely
defined regression estimates and are, therefore, unreliable. 60 We
checked for the presence of multicollinearity among our three
independent variables of time, unemployment, and equal pay. Each
independent variable was regressed on the other two independent
variables. The coefficients of determination (R2 ) indicated the
presence of some multicollinearity (R2 = 66, 57, and 44 percent,
respectively) but not in the high multicollinearity range of 80 to 90
percent. 61
Occupations 5 and 7, then, have successfully passed-minimum
tests for distorting effects of autocorrelation and multicollinearity.
This serves to increase our confidence in the argument that
Ontario's equal pay legislation of 1951 did have some influence in
decreasing male-female wage differentials in some occupations in the
province. The values of our negative beta coefficients for the equal
pay variable highlight the fact that the narrowing impact was weak
to moderate. Comparing the three beta coefficients of occupation
7, we see that the influence of time and unemployment had three
to four times more causal influence than the equal pay variable 1.36 and .697, respectively, versus .295 for equal pay. The equal pay
variable plays a more substantial role in occupation 5 at .608 versus
1.27 (time) and .864 (unemployment), but still shows the weakest
influence of the three variables.
Occupations 5 and 7 have an R 2 of 61 and 69 percent,
respectively, so we are not dealing with insignificant variables with
regard to their explanatory power of male-female wage differentials
in Ontario. The equal pay variable makes up a part of this
composite coefficient of determination and, therefore, cannot be
dismissed as inconsequential. Incidentally, any multicollinearity that

60 M. Lewis-Beck, Applied Regression (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980) at 58-59.
61 Ibid at 60.
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does exist among our three variables does not affect R 2 .62 We can
with some degree of assurance, then, argue for the modest narrowing
impact of FEFRA on the gender-related wage differential in Ontario
for at least two occupational groups.
Even though our linear time series regression analysis yielded
supportive evidence for the moderate, differential influence of
FEFRA on narrowing the male-female wage gap, examination of the
plots of the nine wage differentials over the thirty-four years suggests
that a linear regression is not the best fit for our data. The
curvilinearcharacter of these wage differentials over time is striking.
Informed by these plots, it makes good statistical sense to conduct
a non-linear regression analysis to determine if the explanatory
power of the three variables combined and of equal pay, in
particular, is enhanced by such a transformation. The specific
transformation chosen was a non-linear time variable, that is, time
squared. Most of the plots have a parabolic shape, which suggests
that x and x2 for time would represent the best estimate of the nonlinear character of these data over time. This decision is rooted in
the mathematics of conic sections. When a cone is cut by a plane
at various points on the cone, it results in a circle, ellipse, hyperbola,
or parabola, each with its own defining formula. The formula for a
parabola is the quadratic equation y = ax 2 + bx + c.
With the mathematics of parabolic shapes in mind, a nonlinear time series analysis was conducted. The quadratic equation
employed was: (Wm-Wf)/Wf = bo + biT + b2T 2 + b3 U + b4L.
Each term has the same meaning as in the linear regression where
the dependent variable (Wm-Wf)/Wf is the proportionate malefemale wage differential, T is time, U is the unemployment rate, and
L is the equal pay variable; b0 is the constant and b,, b2 , b3 , b 4 are
the regression coefficients. The unique features of this equation are
the quadratic term, T2 , and the use of four rather than three
independent variables.
From Table 8 we see that the equal pay variable evidences
a more significant narrowing effect on male-female wage differentials
than in the linear regression model. Eight occupations have a

62 P. Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics (London: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1984) at
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negative sign, as opposed to three in the linear fit. Three of these
eight beta coefficients indicate a statistically significant narrowing of
wage differentials. Occupation 6 has been discounted because of a
modestly high autocorrelation coefficient of .49 that produces a
regression result in which the equal pay variable no longer passes
the t-test for significance.
The autocorrelation coefficient for
occupation 9 is only .26, which passes Hibb's critical value of .30.
In comparing the beta coefficients of equal pay with the
unemployment variable, we see that the relative strength of the
equal pay coefficients improves somewhat, especially in occupation
9, where it shows four times the influence of the unemployment
coefficient - .822 versus .207. No comparison or interpretation will
be attempted for the time and time squared variable, since they
obviously are involved in a high degree of multicollinearity. Their
beta coefficients are unstable and unreliable. In this regression
analysis, however, the collinearity of time and time squared does not
affect the reliability of the beta coefficients for unemployment and
equal pay. Nor does it affect the reliability of R 2 .63
The overall fit generated by this non-linear time series
regression analysis has improved the explanatory power of our three
variables. Comparing the R 2 of the linear versus non-linear model,
we see that R 2 has increased in eight of the nine occupations
(occupation 5 remained the same). The largest increase was in
occupation 4, which went from 18 to 37 percent. This result would
be expected after looking at the parabolic shape of the plot for
occupation 4.
The specific influence of the equal pay variable and the
overall fit of the data are improved, therefore, by our non-linear
regression analysis. These regression results lend additional weight
to the argument that Ontario's equal pay law did have a modest to
moderate narrowing effect on gender wage differentials.
Another consideration further improves the explanatory
power of our three variables. We know that the impact of a
variable is often not registered immediately. It takes time for the
dependent variable to respond to the impact of the independent
variable. Regression analysis in the standard form, however, assumes

63 Ibid at 128-29.
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a contemporaneous interrelationship between the dependent and
independent variables. To account for the delayed impact of an
independent variable, it is necessary to time lag the variables in
question.6 4 In our regression analysis the most obvious variable to
lag is the unemployment rate. We carried out a time series
regression analysis, therefore, with the unemployment variable lagged
by one year. In doing so, we are modelling mathematically and
statistically the idea that the effects of any given unemployment rate
on wage differentials will be more significant for the following year
than for the current year. The regression equation is identical to
the non-linear, non-lagged model except for the unemployment
variable which is now b 3Ut.1 rather than b3U. The full expression
is: (Wm-Wf)/Wf = bo + bIT + b2 T2 + b3Ut.1 + b 4L.
This lagged specification further improves the overall fit of
our data and enhances the explanatory status of the equal pay
variable. The lagged regression results are not as dramatically
improved as between the linear versus non-linear model, but they
continue to add credence to the central argument that Ontario's
equal pay law was more than a meaningless piece of rhetoric.
The lagged regression results in Table 9 indicate that eight
of nine occupations have negative beta coefficients for the equal pay
variable and that four of these are statistically significant. The
autocorrelation coefficient of occupation 9 is minimal with an
autocorrelation coefficient of .25. The relative importance of the
equal pay variable versus the unemployment variable is strengthened
somewhat, as two of the four significant coefficients (occupation 6
and 9) evidence greater influence on male-female wage differentials
than the unemployment rate. We found only one such equal pay
coefficient in the non-linear, non-lagged regression (Table 8) and
none in the linear regression (Table 7). Once again, the high
multicollinearity of the time variable does not allow for any reliable
interpretation, but this does not invalidate the beta coefficients of
our unemployment and equal pay variables. Nor does it undermine
the reliability of the coefficient of determination, R 2, which
evidences strong explanatory power for the composite impact on our
dependent variable. Comparing the R 2 of this lagged regression with

64 See Ostrom, supra, note 56 at 44-46.
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the R 2 of Tables 7 and 8, we see moderate to substantial increase
in all nine occupations.
In conclusion, we have found in our time series analysis that
the equal pay law, following its enactment in March 1951 and its
enforcement in January 1952, had a differential and modest impact
on male-female wage differentials. These results call into question
the conclusion that Ontario's equal pay legislation did not narrow
the male-female wage gap. The specific temporal focus of this
analysis on the January 1952 enforcement of FEFRA may be crucial
to these new findings. In any event, our analysis allows us to
conclude with some degree of confidence that the Female Employees
FairRemuneration Act of 1951 was more than political posturing to
gain votes from women and labour. It actually had some impact.
V. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEFRA'S IMPACT
Qualitative analysis of other occupations in Ontario also lends
support to the argument that the equal pay legislation of 1951 had
some influence in narrowing male-female wage differentials. Two
days after FEFRA was introduced into the Ontario Legislature,
Premier Frost ordered all civil service wages and salaries to be
adjusted in conformity to this Act (10 March 1951). The Globe and
Mail report indicated that, based on a survey, FEFRA would affect
"probably not more than 200 to 300 women in government service."65
Apparently, most women were already receiving equal pay for equal
work. Nevertheless, even if FEFRA only equalized the pay of 200 to
300 women, it clearly functioned to bring greater "justice" to those
who were being paid less for substantially equivalent work. There
were 13,000 civil service employees in Ontario in 1951, so FEFRA did
not affect much more than two or three percent of the provincial
government work force. But such a modest and differential impact
is precisely what our quantitative analysis indicated.
We noted when analyzing the Ministry of Labour Annual
Reports that FEFRA was used by various women to complain about

65 "Frost's Equal Pay Bill Draws Opposition Fire" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (13
March 1951) at 5.
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alleged equal pay violations. c6 In 1954, for example, 69 complaints
involving eight employers were received by the Ministry of Labour. 67
By the time of the 1955 Annual Report, all of these complaints had
been "resolved" by conciliation officers.'5 We are not given the
details of how these complaints were settled, but it would be
reasonable to assume that, in at least some of these cases, female
employees were granted wage adjustments.
Additional evidence for the narrowing impact of FEFRA is
provided by the 1954 Saturday Night article mentioned earlier. In
general, Margery Pewtress was highly critical of FEFRA. She
complained, for instance, that employers in the blue-collar work
sector were circumventing the law by adding a few additional
responsibilities to male employees. It is all the more significant,
therefore, when Pewtress concedes in this article that "some
employers in Ontario have revised their wage schedules to comply
with the new Act."69 Assuming that Pewtress is correct, we again
find a pattern of a differential, modest influence of the 1951 equal
pay law in reducing male-female wage differentials.
As already mentioned, wage differentials between male and
female teachers over the years were substantial.70 Did FEFRA have
any narrowing effect on the gender wage gap in the teaching
profession? In line with what we have found in other occupations,
the answer to the question is both yes and no. It depends on which
teachers and which school board we are talking about. Some school
boards did comply with FEFRA by equalizing, or beginning to equalize,
salaries of male and female teachers with the same academic training
and experience. For instance, the Etobicoke school board responded
to the enactment of FEFRA by spending $210,000 (in 1987 dollars)
66See supra, note 23 and accompanying text.
67 Ontario, Department of Labour, Annual Reports (35th Report) (Toronto: Baptist
Johnston, 1954) at 44.
68 Ontario, Department of Labour, Annual Reports (36th Report) (Toronto: Baptist
Johnston, 1955) at 52.
69 See Pewtress, supra, note 26.
70 Cf. Tables 1 and 2, infra at 327, 328.
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to reduce the salary discrepancies between their male and female
teaching staff. The Lakeshore school board was planning to adjust
their salary schedule in 1952 in compliance with FEFRA. The
estimated cost was $700,000 (in 1987 dollars). 71
Numerous other schools apparently complied with the
provisions of FEFRA. The Ontario Secondary School Teachers
Federation (ossTF) published the annual salary schedules of all high
schools in Ontario in their monthly magazine, The Bulletin. The
salary schedules for the years immediately prior to FEFRA's enactment
show many schools reporting male-female salary categories with
salary differences of approximately $200 per category ($1,400 in 1987
dollars). For example, the November 1950 Bulletin presented reports
from 248 high schools in Ontario of which 65 (26 percent) still built
male-female salary differences into their salary schedules. 72 This was
just four months before FEFRA was enacted. However, by the time
that the 1952 salary schedules were published in the October 1952
Bulletin, only eight high schools indicated that they were still paying
male teachers more money than female teachers in each category.
This observation provides fairly strong circumstantial evidence that
Ontario's equal pay law of 1951 had some influence in narrowing
wage differentials in the teaching profession. In fact, in the case of
teachers, we should not talk of a narrowing of the wage gap, but of
an elimination of the differential. When female teachers' salaries
were adjusted to conform to the equal pay law, they usually received
full parity with their male colleagues. In this sense, the impact of
FEFRA was substantial, not modest.
Not all school boards needed to revise their salary schedules
to comply with FEFRA. Some already had equalized the salaries of
their male and female teachers prior to January 1952. In the
Toronto area, the school boards of Weston, York, North York,
Swansea, Forest Hill, Scarborough, and Toronto had an equal pay
73
policy prior to the enactment of Ontario's equal pay law.
71 "Equal Pay for Women to Hit School Budgets" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (12
March 1951) 1.

72 Ontario Secondary School Teachers Federation, The Bulletin (Toronto: OSSTF, 1950).
73 Supra, note 71.
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In 1962 the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act was
transferred from the Ministry of Labour to the newly formed
Ontario Human Rights Commission. FEFRA became part of The
OntarioHuman Rights Code, 1961-62.74 The Ontario Human Rights
Commission was actively involved in attempting to administer
Ontario's human rights laws. During the years 1963 to 1968, the
Commission dealt with 1,299 complaints of alleged discrimination
(see Table 10). 75 It would be a misrepresentation to say that the
Human Rights Commission did nothing about equal pay for equal
work.
Some complaints could not be resolved by conciliation
officers and, therefore, went to a board of inquiry appointed by the
Minister of Labour at the request of the Human Rights Commission.
For instance, Judge Horace Krevar presided over a hearing on 7
May 1968, involving a complaint by Mrs. Mildred Fortey against
Middlesex Creamery Limited of London, Ontario.
Fortey's
complaint read:
I have worked as egg grader for Middlesex Creamery Ltd., London, Ont. for the
past seven years continually. I was placed on the present automatic egg grading
machine in January 1966. Since that time I have performed exactly the same egg

grading work as my two male co-workers. To the best of my knowledge there is
absolutely no difference in work and circumstances of work on the machine

compared to my male co-workers. I am receiving at this time $1.70 per hour, while
the male employees are receiving $1.91 per hour for the same type of work. I feel
I have been discriminated against in not receiving equal pay for equal work. 7 6

On the basis of the evidence presented at the inquiry, Judge
Krevar decided that "in paying Mrs. Fortey less than the male egg
graders the respondent company has been violating public policy as
expressed in Section 5 of the Ontario Human Rights Code 196162."77 Judge Krevar did not fine Middlesex Creamery, but he did
order the company "to pay Mrs. Fortey the difference between what

S.O. 1961-62, c. 93, s. 5.

75 See infra at 335.
76 Fortey v. Middleser Creamery Limited (1968), Ontario Human Rights Commission
Decision, Case 22.
77

Ibid at 10.
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she has been paid and what she would have been paid if no
differential had existed" from January 1966 to the date of
repayment. 78
Besides recovering back wages for female employees, the
Ontario Human Rights Commission carried on an extensive
education effort during these years to inform employers, employees,
and the public about Ontario's Code of Human Rights, including the
equal pay for equal work provision. The Commission distributed
thousands of pieces of literature every year, conducted workshops
and conferences, made films for distribution, placed posters in public
places, and gave talks on radio and television. It is not possible to
measure the impact of such efforts in dollars and cents, but most
people agreed that education was a key factor in attempting to
eliminate discrimination in employment and in other areas of society.
By 1968, the Minister of Labour apparently decided that
more could be done by way of enforcing Ontario's equal pay law.
Dalton Bales, as Minister of Labour, introduced two bills in May
1968 to implement this concern. In Bill 133, 79 the Ontario Code of
Human Rights was amended by repealing the equal pay section.
This section was then transferred to Bill 130,80 a new Employment
Standards Act. When introducing this transfer of the equal pay
provision, Mr. Bales gave the following justification:
The commission (Human Rights Commission) acts only on the receipt of a
complaint. This provision has been transferred to The Employment Standards Act
where it will be enforced on a regular basis by the appropriate field staff of the
department. The wording of the section has 8been
broadened and clarified to assist
1

field staff in making on-the-job assessments.

It is clear from this statement that the Ministry of Labour
had decided to be more aggressive in enforcing Ontario's equal pay
law. Rather than wait for complaints to be sent in by individuals,

78 Ibid. at 17.
79

An Act to Amend The OntarioHuman Rights Code, 1961-62, 1st Sess., 28th Leg. Ont.,

1968, s. 1.
80 The Employment Standards Act 1968, 1st Sess., 28th Leg. Ont., 1968, s. 19(1).
81 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates, No. 94 at 3387 (27 May 1968).
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the Employment Standards Branch was planning to undertake a
regular, systematic check of business establishments to determine if
they were in compliance with the equal pay section. The wording
of the equal pay provision was revised and expanded for the first
time since 1951. The operative section read as follows:
(1) No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall discriminate
between his male and female employees by paying a female employee at a rate of
pay less than the rate of pay paid to a male employee, or vice versa, employed by
him for the same work performed in the same establishment, the performance of
and responsibility, and which is performed under
which requires equal skill, effort,
82
similar working conditions....

This equal pay law was still a "same work, same
establishment" piece of legislation, but it defined more clearly what
"same work" meant8 3 and added provisions to prevent employers
from side-stepping the intent of the equal pay law.84 Also the new
Act gave the director of the Employment Standards Branch the legal
authority to investigate a company and to make on-the-spot
assessments and collections of unpaid wages.85 The employer was
obligated to produce all records for the Ministry of Labour, which
had the right to "inspect and examine all books, payrolls and other
records" relevant to any provision of the Employment StandardsAct,
including the equal pay section.86 Any employer who dismissed or
threatened to dismiss an employee for complaining or giving
information to the Ministry of Labour's Employment Standards
Branch was subject to a $1,000 fine. Any employer charged with
violation of the equal pay section was not only required to pay back
wages but could be fined up to $1,000.87

82 Employment StandardsAct, S.O. 1968, c. 35, s. 19.
83 Ibid., s. 19(1).
84 Ibid, ss 19(2)-(3).
85 Ibid., s. 19(4).
86

Ibid, ss 32-33.

87 Ibid,Is. 36.
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The Employment Standards Branch reports on a yearly basis
how many employers were involved in alleged equal pay violations,
how many employees were involved, and how much money was
collected in back wages for female employees. Table 1188 presents
these data for the years 1969 to 1984. The Employment Standards
Act had only been in force for three months by the time of the
March 1969 Annual Report, so the number of cases and dollar
settlements are low for that year. Data for the years 1971, 1972,
1974, and 1977, however, indicate substantial back wages recovery
for female employees in Ontario. The highest annual monetary
settlement occurred in 1974, with 409 female employees receiving
$547,192 in back wages from eighteen employers who had violated
Ontario's equal pay law. These dollar amounts are back wages and
do not take into account the large sums of money that employers
had to pay out in order to remain in compliance with the equal pay
law.
The equal pay section of the Employment StandardsAct was
further revised in 1974 to make the law more enforceable. Only two
words were added to the operative section, but they were important
words. In line with what the CCF and Liberal parties had been
advocating since 1951, the Progressive Conservatives added the word
"substantially" to the law so that it read as follows:
(1) No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall differentiate
between his male and female employees by paying a female employee at a rate of
pay less than the rate of pay paid to a male employee, or vice versa, for
substantially the same kind of work performed in the same establishment, the
performance of which requires substantially the same skill, effort,
and responsibility,
89
and which is performed under similar working conditions....

Although the revised law still applied only to male-female
wage differentials within the same business establishment, the word
"substantially" broadened the meaning of "same work" to include jobs
that were basically the same. A second word was added to
strengthen this idea. Instead of the expression "the same work"
found in the 1951 and 1968 equal pay laws, we find the phrase "the
same kind of work." With this loosening of the requirements,
88 See infra at 336.
89 Employment StandardsAct, S.O. 1968, c. 35, as am. S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 33.
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officers from the Employment Standards Branch could more
aggressively pursue the male-female wage issue with Ontario
employers. This version of the equal pay section of the Employment
StandardsAct has remained in force from 1974 to the present.
Between the years 1969 to 1984, the administration of this
equal pay law has allowed for the collection of $3,349,898 in back
wages for female employees in Ontario (see Table 11). When
academics, women's organizations, and political opposition parties
charge that equal pay legislation in Ontario has been a failure, they
are simply uninformed about the 15,990 female employees in Ontario
who have collected back wages over the past sixteen years through
the efforts of the Ministry of Labour's Employment Standards
Branch.
More generally, our results suggest that the Female
Employees Fair Remuneration Act, the first of its kind in the
Commonwealth, had a selective and modest impact on wage
differentials in Ontario. This does not in any way detract from an
argument that more effective legislation is required. Indeed, we take
the small but significant measure of success that we have found as
encouragement for the process of legislative reform. Our evidence
suggests that such reforms can make a difference.
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TABLE 1
Salaries in the Toronto Common School System
1858
Titles

Superintendent

Pay

$1,200

Secretary (male)

600

Headmaster

700

Male Assistant

520

Headmistress

400

Female Teacher

320

Female Assistant

280

Female Junior Assistant

240

Monitor Teacher (female)

170

Source: . Acton, P. Goldsmith & B. Shepard eds, Women at Work Ontario, 1850-1930

(Toronto: Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974) at 182.
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TABLE 2
Salaries of Teachers In Toronto
Date

Women

Men

1858

$ 240-

400

$ 520-

700

1870

222-

400

600-

700

1881

200-

600

750-1,100

1901

225-

675

600-

1910

400-

900

900-1,400

1920

1,000 - 2,000

1,625 - 2,500

1930

1,000 - 2,400

1,200 - 3,000

900

Source: Ibid., Table 1.

TABLE 3

Comparison of Gender Based Wage Differentials (Wf/Wm)*
Cotton and Wool Manufacturing, Ontario 1921-1950

1921

1930

1940

Range

.75

.67

.46

.34

Mean

.64

.57

.70

.77

Median

.54

.51

.73

.76

* Wf = female wages; Wm = male
wages

1950

1989]
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TABLE 4
Hourly/Weekly Wage Rates, 1950
Ontario/Toronto
Selected Occupations
HourlylWeekly Rate

Occupation

Combing Tender

Male

Female

WfWm

$ .99

$ .90

.91

Spinner

1.25

.89

.71

Warper Tender

1.02

.81

.79

Weaver

1.10

1.01

.92

Packer

1.07

.81

.76

Knitter

.95

.79

.83

Cutter

1.04

.73

.70

Trimmer

1.10

.88

.80

Stitcher

1.07

.79

.74

Sales Clerk (Time)

46.73

29.12

.62

Sales Clerk (Commission)

56.27

32.63

.58

Cook

43.76

32.39

.74

Dishwasher

28.25

24.30

.86

Range = .92-.58 = .34

Mean = .77

Median = .76

Source: Canada, Department of Labour, Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour in Canada
(Ottawa: Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, 1950) Tables V and X.
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TABLE 5
Sex Ratios in Annual Earnings
Canada, 1961
Sex Ratio

Occupation

All Wage Earners

Full-year Earners

All Occupations

54.2

59.3

Managerial

48.1

51.6

Professional/Technical

43.3

61.2

Clerical

60.8

74.1

Sales

35.2

44.8

Service/Recreation

47.4

47.2

Transportation

62.2

69.4

Farmers

43.3

59.6

Craftsmen

50.1

55.7

Labourers

67.2

66.9

Source: S. Ostry, The Female Worker in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, Census Monograph,
D.BS., Cat. No. 99-553, 1968) at 41.
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TABLE 6
Sex Ratios in Annual Earnings
Unadjusted and Adjusted Data
Canada, 1961
Sex Ratio

Adjustment Factor

Female Weights Male Weights

Unadjusted

59.3

59.3

Occupational Distribution

67.2

65.6

Age

72.5

68.5

Education

79.2

74.1

Age and Education

85.0

77.5

Source: S. Ostry, ibid. at 43.
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TABLE 7
Standardized Linear Regression Results for Male-Female Wage
Differentials in Nine Select Occupations, 1946-1979
Occup.

Time

1.

-.783*

Unemployment

.528*

R2

D-W

.172

22

1.05+

Equal Pay

2.

-. 096

-. 478

.213

22

1.33+

3.

.374

.112

.370*

58**

1.38+

4.

.204

-. 458

.379

18

0.96+

5.

1.270*

-.864*

-.608*

61**

1.66

6.

1.040*

-. 856*

.038

49**

0.90+

7.

1.360*

-.697*

-.295*

69**

1.55+

8.

-.496*

-. 441"

.370*

49**

1.02+

9.

-. 417

-. 021

34**

1.28+

-. 200

Notes: The regression equation is (Win - Wf)/ Wf = b 0 + bT + b2 U + b3 L.
N = 34 years based on 1946-1979.
Significant t-statistic for regression coefficients at .05 level (critical t value = 2.04).
Significant F-statistic for the overall relationship at .05 level (critical F-test value

=

2.92

at F3,3 0 ).
+ Positive autocorrelation at .05 level (critical Durbin Watson statistic: dI = 1.12dg = 1.63;
Theil-Nagar Q = 1.58).
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TABLE 8
Standardized Non-linear Non-lagged Regression Results for
Male-Female Wage Differentials in Nine Select Occupations
1946-1979
Occup.

Time

Time Sq.

6.92

-7.52

7.03

-6.96

7.70

Unemp.
.720*

R2

Equal Pay

D-W

-. 353

1.21+

-. 300

-. 273

1.76

-7.16

.295

-. 130

1.91

10.50

-10.00

-. 203

-. 319

1.29+

1.09

0.17

-.868*

-.596*

1.66

9.57

--8.33

-. 643*

-544*

1.08+

3.82

-2.40

-.635*

-. 462*

1.64

2.35

-2.78

-. 370

.176

1.01+

8.71

-8.91

.207

-. 822*

1.52+

Notes: The regression equation is (Wm-WO/Wf
N = 34 based on years 1946-1979.

2

= b0 + b1 T + b2 T

+ b3 U + b4 L.

Significant t-statistic for regression coefficients at .05 level (critical t value = 2.04).
** Significant F-statistic for the overall relationship at .05 level (critical F-test value = 2.70
at F4 ,2 9 ).

+ Positive autocorrelation at .05 level (critical Durbin Watson statistic: d, = 1.06 d, = 1.70;
Theil-Nagar Q = 1.64).
(1)

The autocorrelation coefficient for occupation six is .49 which renders this regression
unreliable. A regression to eliminate the autocorrelation gave a non-significant equal
2
pay coefficient of -. 173, an R of 35%, and a D-W of 2.09.
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TABLE 9
Standardized Non-Linear Lagged Regression Results for Male-Female
Wage Differentials in Nine Select Occupations, 1946-1979
Time

Sq.

Occup.

Constant

Time

1.

.042

6.37

-7.01

2.

-. 040

9.14

-9.10

3.

-. 002

8.14

4.

-. 071

5.

Unemp.

.745*

Equal Pay

R2

D-WV

-. 236

36*

1.42+

-. 108

-. 377

30**

1.88

-7.57

.308

-. 089

69**

1.99

12.80

-12.20

-. 181

-. 378

45**

1.43+

-. 127

3.62

-2.11

-1.030"

-. 729*

81"*

1.77

6.

-. 099

12.60

-11.20

-.593*

-. 686*

69**

1.75

7.

-. 103

6.48

-4.89

-. 670*

-. 583*

80**

1.64

8.

-. 088

4.76

-5.03

-. 409*

.101

57**

1.37+

9.

-. 008

9.86

-10.10

.331

-. 823*

52**

1.55+

Notes: The regression equation: (Wm-Wf)/Wf = b0 + biT + b2 T 2 + b3 Ut.1 + b4 L.
N = 34 based on years 1946-1979

Significant t-statistic for regression coefficient at .05 level (critical t value = 2.04).
Significant F-statistic for the overall relationship at .05 level (critical F-test value = 2.70
at F4 ,2 9 ).
+ Positive autocorrelation at .05 level (critical Durbin-Watson statistic: d, = 1.06 di = 1.70;
Theil-Nagar Q = 1.64).
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TABLE 10
Cases Investigated, 1963-1968, Ontario Human Rights Commission
Emplo)ment Accommodation

Housing

Publication

Equal Pay

Total

1963

19

7

13

6

0

45

1964

59

18

15

2

0

94

1965

88

5

13

3

13

122

1966

113

9

31

1

12

166

1967

173

15

49

8

89

336

1968

157

70

84

20

165

536

Total

609

124

205

40

279

1299

Source: Ontario, Department of Labour, Annual Reports (Toronto: Baptist Johnston, 19631968).
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TABLE 11
Equal Pay Cases and Monetary Settlements, 1969-1984
Employment Standards Branch
# of Employers

# of Employees
75

Total

414

Amount Collected*
$

3,227

761

91,171

1,129

477,415

3,673

488,616

176

37,154

409

547,192

114

40,211

76

31,248

452

535,966

20

6,673

29

8,312

50

66,607

386

216,648

749

331,561

1,781

341,138

110

126,758

15,990

$3,349,898

* rounded to nearest dollar
Source: Ontario, Department of Labour, Annual Reports (Toronto: Baptist Johnston, 19691984).

